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Christopher M. Duncan

Liberalism and the Challenge of Fight Club:
Notes Toward an American Theory of the Good Life
I Jere too the context seems to contaminate
the form, only the misery here is the
misery of happiness. . . an unhappiness
that doesn't know its name, that has no
way of telling itself apart from genuine
satisfaction and fulfillment since it has
presumably never encountered this last.
- Fredric Jameson
... if the moral force of liberalism is still
stimulating, its sociological content is
weak; it has no theory of society adequate
to its moral aims.
- C. Wright Mills
I felt like destroying something beautiful.
- "Jack," the narrator of Fight Club
The banality of homo economicus
produces homo brutalitas.
- Michael Gillespie
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In an episode of Sat11rdqy Night Uve, the T.V.
sensation IW'ho IW'a11ts To Be A Millio11aire? was
treated satirically by replacing the usual middle
class contestants with what were supposed to be
poor peasants from some unnamed, developing
country and having them compete for various food
products rather than cash. As a female contestant
answered the questions, she moved from a sack of
rice to a block of cheese to a pile of meat while her
husband rooted for her from the audience. he was
finally stumped with a question that asked her to
name a disease where young women intentionally
starve themselves even though they have access to
plentiful food. Incredulous, the contestant shook
her head in disbelief and asked with genuine astonishment how there could be such a disease. The
satire asked Americans to look at themselves
through the eyes of people for whom depravation
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and hunger is a condition of existence and not a culturally induced psychological
affliction. In other words, Americans were asked to acknowledge that they were
different than much of the world but not in the exceptional way they typically
imagine. It is this difference that serves as the starting point for this essay, though
perhaps not in the way many would expect. My project aims not to condemn,
shame, or celebrate American difference. Instead, my hope is to begin a much
needed diaJogue that is necessitated by this difference, one that is taking place too
infrequently within the American academy, among our social elites or within the
culture at large. The reasons this conversation is not taking place arc manifold, but
they tend to cohere around cultural embarrassment, indifference, ignorance, and,
perhaps most importantly, the beneficiaries of the silence. Simply put, the conversation that many Americans are not having is about what constitutes the good life
in the American liberal context. Many Americans must reacquaint themselves in a
serious and p11blic way with Emerson's question: " I Tow ought I to live?" (qtd. in
Abbott 11).

Post-Liberal not Post-Modern
In the movie version of S. E. Hinton's novel Ri1111ble Fish, Mickey Rourke
plays a misanthropic outlaw-genius known as the "Motorcycle Boy," of whom
his drunken, classically-educated father (played by Dennis I lopper) says, " I Tc
could be anything he wants, but just can't think of anything he wants to be."
While not the most important problem in the world, nor perhaps even among
the most important problems facing the American republic, the implications
contained in that brief observation arc pertinent and pressing enough to warrant theoretical treatment. Twenty-first century America has produced a unique
personality, one that is neither plebeian nor patrician. 1nslead, we have citiicns
who arc composites types: plebeian or commoner in taste and sentiment and patrician or aristocratic in means and opportunity- " plebeicians/' if you will.
These arc educated men and women of the middle class who take for granted
that they have a right to pursue happiness but who do not have any clear idea or
conception of what happiness is. In other words, they believe they can be almost anything they want to be, but they do not know anything they really 1110111
to be.
While making no claims that my sample is representative in a scientific or statistically valid manner, I draw the following insights from observation, conversation, and fifteen years of teaching political theory to undergraduates, who largely
comprise the plebeician class, at both large state universities and smaller private
religious institutions. In many instances, the problem manifests itself passively in
the form of indifference masquerading as tolerance. As an old Calvin and I lob bes
cartoon once proclaimed, "When you're cool the world bores you." In my teaching, I have seen not only a vague and (strangely) reactionary allegiance to the notion of tolerance, but often an inability or unwillingness to demonstrate any
deeply-held beliefs that transcend the self. Whether it is from an inability to defend one's attachments persuasively, from fear of ridicule for a lack of sophistication or from the larger fear of being labeled "judgmental" (and, hence, politically
reprobate), students seem reluctant to engage in civil forms of public scrutiny, let
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alone serious confrontations about values and meaning that might force them either to take a stand or to re-evaluate their own beliefs and choices. However, in
private conversations and in their journals, I hear and sense a longing for more.
They do not want to spend their lives like Tolstoy's Ivan Ilych, who proclaimed
near his death, " l s it really is sol I lost my life over that curtain as I might have
clone when storming a fort. Ts that possible? How terrible and how stupid" (134).
Yet they cannot seem to escape a social logic that perpetuates exactly this form of
life. While there arc numerous sub-classes within American culture in general and
youth-culture in particular for whom the above is something of a misnomer or
even a red-herring, they remain susceptible to the same malaise that characterizes
plebeician youth.
Cultural theorist Anne Norton,s discussion of the relationship between
American liberalism and shopping can be instructive here if we extrapolate the
potential for psychological discontentment on the part of the reflective citizen
who secs himself or herself in the following passage:
The practice of shopping cnncts liberal theory's identification of choice with
freedom nnd, in thnt ennctmcnt, suggests n critique. lndividunlity, the
conventions governing property, nnd the utility of rcprcsentntion as an
instrument of the nuthor's will nre nil cnllcd into question. We renlize, ns we
shop, thnt choice mny be experienced ns freedom, nnd ns compulsion. The
choices we nppcnr to mnke hnve nlrendy been mndc for us. The individuality
we priic is rcnliicd in purchnses thnt deconstruct it. Property shows itself not
only ns n menns for self-protection, sclf-ex'Pression, and self-discovery but
nlso ns n mcnns for subjecting us to the nuthority of others. The enactment
of the idem; of libernlism works simultaneously to confirm nnd subvert them

(4)

Despite the fact that the group I am speaking about may not be representative
of the whole, 1 would argue that no country can afford to ignore this plebeician
phenomenon because of the mischief this "class" might cause. Pew things are as
pregnant with the potential for social and political disruption as a right or an entitlement in search of animation and reification. Such is the price for open-ended
theorizations that grant opportu nities to act without stipulating the objects or
ends toward which the action ought to be directed. An historical context that still
assumes that rights Qike the right to pursue happiness) arc "inalienable" or foundational but has either rejected or forgotten the teleological imperative (the object
of this pursuit) and, hence, has simultaneously embraced an anti-foundationalism,
is one that is neither foundational nor anti-foundational. It is a context that is
post-liberal but not post-modern. uch is the America of the Motorcycle Boy and
his contemporary band of lost boys and girls.
The first "liberals" were both foundationalists and heroic without being
"ironists" 0lorty, Co11li11ge11cy xv). At great personal risk to themselves, they opposed the old authoritarian and hierarchical political regime in straightforward and
practical language and with simple religious confidence in their political position.
While not self-consciously liberal, the following passage from The Twelve Articles
issued during the German peasant revolt in the mid-1520's sets the tone for the
politics and theory that follows during the next two centuries:
Article 3
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It has been the custom hitherto for men to hold us as their own
property which is pitiable enough considering that Christ has
redeemed and purchased us without exception, by the shedding of
I Iis precious blood, the lowly as well as the great. Accordingly, it is
consistent with Scripture that we would be free and we wish to be so.
Not that we want to be absolutely free and under no authority. God
does not teach us that we should lead a disorderly life according to the
lusts of the flesh, but that we should live by the commandments, love
our God and our neighbor. (qtd. in Klosko 311-12)

something called a )jberal bourgeois. Tn my story, it is the liberal bourgeois who
becomes simply a bourgeois (my post-liberal "plebeician"). Walzer's model is laid
out in the following manner (which I reproduce at some length but not in its entirety):
1. At a certain point ... there appears a band of "strangers" who view
themselves as chosen men, saints and who seek a new order. ...

2. These men arc marked off from their fellows by an extraordinary selfassurance and daring.

Along with this, they demanded certain rights and protections from the Lords,
like the right to hunt, cut wood, and avoid overt exploitation (Klosko 311). In
the most parsimonious voice of what would become traditional "liberalism,"
they asked for no political power without limits, liberty without license, and
equality without leveling, and each of these claims was rooted in a biblical
foundation and nurtured by an overtly Christian teleology, without which the
sacrifices to come would have made little sense to the actors themselves.• The
political result of the peasants' demands, of course, took the form of the German nobility heeding Martin Luther's advice in his not so subtle tract Agoi11.!1 llJ1
Robbing M11rderi11g Hordes of Peasa11/s.
The Germans were not alone. Everywhere what would become liberal reforms appeared, war, slaughter, and repression quickly followed. Political liberalism emerged from the womb of the modern world breached and bloody,
surrounded by enemies, and demanding God-given rights and powers that would
only be named " liberal" once its viability was assured. In some places, the enemies
won, at least for a while. Elsewhere, as the adherents grew first in resolve and then
in power, they remade the world by suffering, dying, and then returning the favor;
they cut off the head of divine right, both figuratively and literally, not to melt all
that was solid into air or to profane all that was holy, but to make the Word flesh.
After 400 years, our theorists have managed to turn the flesh back into word.
Taking our gains for granted, we have forgotten that " liberalism" was struggled
for and lived through first, theorized later. While the latter was open to claims that
it was socially constructed and, hence, possibly variable, the former was assumed
to have ontological validity. Indeed, the words and arguments that became a theoretical structure to house the liberal-self were contestable and no doubt imperfect
representations of the reality they sought to signify, but the selves living within its
walls were assumed to be "facts." Interpretable, yes, but superfluou s never. Today,
however, the structure itself is so battered that we have begun to doubt that anyone could be living in it still. IIence the talk of the dccentcrcd subject that has
been so much in vogue (foucault; Derrida). In what follows, I would like to borrow and adapt an argument made by Michael Walzer some years ago to sketch
how I believe this phenomenon came to pass.
In his book The Revo/11tio11 of the Sai11ls, Walzer sets out "a model of radica l
politics" based on the experience of the English Puritans that he believes has general implications for understanding later radical movements (317-320). The
"story" of forgetting and overcoming (used here as a neutral descriptive term)
that Walzer teUs at the close of his work is similar to the one I want to tell. For
Walzer, it is the revolutionary Puritan saint who is forgotten and overcome by

While leaving the historical con nection to religion intact, I would like to apply
this model/argument in a more focused manner to the political aspects of the
equation. It is my inference that the number of "warriors" fighting the old order
as a whole greatly exceec.led the number of leaders who saw themselves as divine
"instruments." These foot soldiers of modernity sought the protections, rights,
and powers of what is called liberal citizenship. They were no less heroic, no less
revolutionary, no less assured, no less disciplined, and no less interested in bringing about a new political order. I Towever, they were more optimistic about human
nature, more sanguine about the prospects for the emergent individualism, and,
hence, less inclinec.l to repress their fellow travelers or their opponents into conformity beyond acceptance of a constitutional order and the rule of law. To paraphrase Walzer: The triumph of Lockean ideas, on the other hand, suggests the
overcoming of anxiety, the appearance of saints and citizens for whom sin is no
longer a problem. The struggle against the old order seems largely to be won by
Locke's time, and the excitement, confusion, and fearfulness of that struggle almost forgotten. Lockean liberals found it possible to dispense with religious, even
with ideological, controls in human society and thought enthusiasm and battlereadiness unattractive i11111e11. ln a sense, then, liberalism was dependent upon the

122

123

3. The band of the chosen confronts the existing world as if in war.
4. The organization of the chosen suggests the nature of the new order they
seek, but also reflects the necessities of the present struggle.
5. The acting out of sainthood produces a new kind of politics. . . .
c. The violent attack upon customary procedures sets the saints free to
experiment politically.
6. The historical role of the chosen band is twofold. Externally, as it were, the
band of snints is n political movement aiming at social reconstruction....
D1sc1plinc 1s the cure for freedom and "unsettledness."

Walzer then goes on to claim that
One dny, however, that security becomes habit and zeal is no longer a worldly
necessity. Then the ume of God's people is over. In this world, the last word
always belongs to the worldings and not the saints.... They set the stage of
history for the new order. Once that order is esmblished, ordinary men are
cager enough to desert the warfare of the Lord for some more moderate
pursuit of virtue. Once they feel sufficiently secure as gentlemen and
merchants, as country justices and members of Parliament, they happily
forego the further privilege of being "instruments." (319)
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olherJ O$f1i11JI him, if 111e thiflk hiJ example or co11verJalio11 like!J lo ha1ie a pemicio111
e.fftct OfJ thoJe 1vith 111hom he aJsociales. (72, emphasis mine)

But Mill docs not stop with his assertion of the reciprocal nature of the rights
of individuals; he goes on to paint a general picture of the sorts of individuals
who might be pernicious and deserving of our avoidance: a person who shows
rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit, who cannot live within moderate means, who
cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences-who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect-must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favorable
sentiments (72-73). By inverting Mill's picture above, I believe we can recast rus
negative injunction concerning what to avoid as a positive proclamation about
what to embrace. In other words, if we want to be the sort of person who does
not wish to have others warned against seeking our society, we should not be
rash, obstinate, conceited, immoderate, unrestrained, overly indulgent, animalistic, unfeeling, or anti-intellectual but rather the opposites of these things. For
lack of a better term, such a person would have what we could call a liberal
character and disposition. But, if the opinions of others did not matter, why
should such a character be preferred to an aliberal or even illiberal one?
Mill hm; an answer for this question as well, namely the lack of such a character deme>nstrates "want of personal dignity and self-respect" (73). Since rus
larger concern in this chapter of 011 Uberty is the relationship between the society and the individual, Mill docs not say much else with regard to inruvidual
psychology. The implication, however, strikes me as plain: those inruviduals
who deny their own dignity by embracing some form of ilUberal life arc somehow deformed as human beings as a result. While for Mill that deformity is not
the business of society insofar as it docs no harm to others, he docs leave room
open for intervention on the part of friends. In his words, "the worst we shall
think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if 111e do 1101 i11terftre
be11evolmt/y by sho111i11g i11lerest or co11cem for bi11I' (74). Such a friendly intervention,
one must assume, would need to include the following stages: demonstrating
and persuading the individual in question of the nature of the deformity, showing him or her the path to rectifying it, and finally explaining the utility of the
change to the individual. The first two strike me as simply logical and obvious
but the last is a little trickier and requires a return to the earlier line of argument about the historical development of liberalism itself.
While Wal~cr's model above docs a good job of explaining ho111 liberalism
came to be, neither he nor 1 have answered the question of 111/!J it came to be. The
German peasants outlined the moral authority for their request to be free, but we
were never told why they wished to be free in the first place. Such is the power of
the term "freedom" in our contemporary lexicon-we assume that the answer to
the question is "self-evident." But, of course, it is not necessarily the case. There is
any number of reasons why someone would like to be free and not all of them are
good ones; there arc also good reasons for rejecting freedom in favor of other values (1Tobbcs). What 1 want to suggest is that there arc specifically liberal reasons
for wanting to be free and that those reasons, in a general sense, represent the teleological thrust of liberalism. Jn place of Richard Rorty's negative description of
a " liberal" as someone who thinks "that cruelty is the worst thing we can do"
(Co11li11ge11ry xv), 1 would like to argue that we substitute a positive definition based
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existence of "saints," that is, of persons whose good behavior could be relied
upon. At the same time, the secular and genteel character of Hbcralism was determined by the fact that these were "saints" whose goodness (sociability, moral decency, or mere respectability) was self-assured and relaxed, free from the
nervousness and fanaticism of Calvinjst godliness (303).
While liberalism was not nearly so complete elsewhere in 1700, it soon
would be in various iterations throughout the West. In what would become the
United States, liberalism was, in IIartz's phrase, "a kind of self-completing
mechanism" (6), in other words, more or less innate (Boorstin Gmi11s and "Our
Unspoken"). As such, even our revolution could be characterized as a "conservative" event, especially when compared to the French Revolution (Arendt 011
Revol11tio11). Although the rustorical/idcological theorizations of the American
revolutionary period vary considerably,2 the bulk of the post-founding American citizenry can be aptly characterized as Wab~cr's "worldings" (Wood Radicalism). fi'or such people, citizenship is valuable for the protections and
opportunities it affords them to pursue various public and private projects; it is
mostly an instrumental good rather than the primary good or end in itself that it
is often argued to be in republjcan political theory (Aristotle Politics; Arendt The

H111na11 Co11ditio11).
Ilowcvcr, rather than providing another lament about the decline of civic responsibility in the American liberal state (Barber; Elshtain), my purpose here is a
little ruffcrcnt. I want to assert that even though American liberals in general
viewed politics as instrumental, e.g. as preserving the right to pursue happiness,
they did not view the ends pursued as bereft of teleological import. While they
may have been early versions of what we now call "value pluralists"J regarding the
power of the state to impose various kinds of social, political, or religious orthodoxjcs on its citizenry, they did not necessarily believe that one opinion or way of
life was as good as the next. You can be (or perhaps co11/d be) a "value pluralist"
politically without embracing relativism personally (Galston "Value" 770). lndccd,
early liberalism's close intellectual tics to the Enlightenment explicitly rule out
such relativism even while taking a hard stand in the name of tolerance (Locke).
Liberals like Locke, Jefferson, and Mill bcHeved that the "truth" was out there and
that the "free market place of ideas" was the best hope for discovering it. What
makes them "liberals" rather than "conservatives" is not their rejection of truth as
an ideal, but rather their unwillingness to impose it on others and repress those
with whom they disagree. As Mill himself put it, "We can never be sure that the
opinion we arc endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion" (18). J f owevcr, this brand
of liberal humility should not be confused with an intellectual indifference that
refuses to engage in critical judgment. As Mi ll explains later:
We have a right, also, in various ways, to acl upon our unfavorable opinion of
anyone, not to the oppression of his indjvidualil-y, bul in Lhe exercise of ours.
We arc not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it
(th~ugh not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the
society most acceptable to us. lire ha11e a right, a11d ii 111ay be our dury, to caution
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on Thoreau's sentiments in l'Paldm. In other words, a " liberal,, is some who
wants to "live deliberatively... and not, when !they] come to die, discover that
[they] had not lived,,, who docs not wish to practice "resignation,,, and who
wants to "live deep and suck out all the marrow of life,, (47-48). While this
may seem like a redefinition, it is in my mind a rededication. It is necessary because so many of us have forgotten and hence transformed liberalism into something very different without having engaged in a deliberative process as such. At
the most basic level, this is worth talking about because I believe the initial
goals of liberal theory and practice were justifiable and, in a sense, "true.»
To live "deliberately,,, however, requires that individuals arc not "deformed,, either by their own poor choices or by society's repressive mechanisms.
The first "liberals,, (Walzcr's saints and, later, their liberal bourgeois progeny)
understood this and embarked simultaneously (though in varying degrees) on individual-friendly political projects a11d very demanding, rigorous projects of the
self. While the second projects took many forms, what linked them together
was the imperative of choo.ri11g and the quest for proficiency and excellence. The
goal of the modern liberal world was the same as that of the classical world of
Aristotle, namely happiness (Aristotle, Ethics Bk. I). The price for happiness wns
diligence and excellence in the things chosen. The important point of departure
for liberalism from the classical world, from the medieval Christian world, and
even from modern republican ideology, was the staunch belief that the good itself could be multiple and varied even if the injunction to pursue it vigorously
was uniform. Instead of building a "city on a hill,,, we would build selvu 011 the
hill for everyone else to sec and maybe emulate.
In this way, the right to pursue happiness can be said to have implied a reciprocal d11ty to pursue happiness. The liberal needs to be politically free to be happy,
and so the state mu st not arbitrarily prevent the pursuit of individual excellence.
But, the liberal must be "undeformed,, personally and sociall y as well and, hence,
demand the sort of discipline from one's self that in other eras was supplied by
the state, Church, or other authoritarian institutions (uscc.I here in a non-pejorative
manner). When individuals fail to discipline themselves, the liberal a la Mill, must
resist stepping in with the state to "force them to be free,,, and, instead, pity them.
Friends, however, can demonstrate (and may even have a duty to demonstrate)
concern and intervene benevolently-though not in an authoritarian manner- to
help an individual sec and want to heal the deformity. Friends do this because they
want those they care about to be capable of happiness; they <lo not have to avoid
their friends or warn others to do so. 4 1t is my argument that, like Walzer's liberal
bourgeois who "forgot,, that he or she stood on space created by the Puritan
saint, the contemporary bourgeois has "forgotten,, that he or she stands on the
space created by the liberal insofar as the contemporary bourgeois accepts the
right to pursue happiness as foundational in origin but ignores the duty to do so.
They do this under the mistaken assumption that whatever is chosen is, by virtue
of having been chosen, good and in no need of any defense beyond what is minimally acceptable to the actor. While preventing the state from stepping in and enforcing such a duty, no early liberal like Locke, Mill, or Jefferson would have
accepted this position as legitimate (If olmcs).

As liberals of one sort or another, most authentic, founding American
thinkers would have rejected such a position as well by casting aspersion on
such people, pitying them, or intervening as "friends.,, Unfortunately, such
thinkers arc becoming less visible and audible, and an important tradition in
American political theory is being lost. In turn, a liberalism worthy of the name
is
disappearing
as
the
processes
of "bourgeoisification»s
and
"postmodcrnization,, continues in the wake of our own forgetfulness. It is to
this disappearing tradition that we must turn if we are to recover American liberalism in its fullest and most defensible form and rescue American political
thought from what I will call the challenge of Fight C/11b in the final section of
this essay.
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America's Sermonic Tradition and Our True Lost Soul
While rejecting much of the ocratic metaphysic concerning the good life,
American liberalism still held fast to the notion of a good life. Though the possible "lives" that might be considered "good,, were plural in liberal America, the
need to defend one's choices and strategics (ends and means) was constant. Residues of liberalism persist today. While often asked harmlessly enough, the question "What c.lo you want to be when you grow up?,, is culturally loaded. Contrary
to most traditional societies, the question carries with it the pregnant possibility
embedded in the core of liberal ideology; we can, quite literally in many cases,
choose what we want to be. I fowcvcr, once answered, the question most certainly
begs the next: "Why?" still beyond the second question, there is often a third stage
to the conversation that involves the various demands and risks involved in the
given choice and perhaps even a discussion of alternatives that might be more appropriate for a given person. J~vcn though the state is denied much of a role in an
individual's decision, others arc not. I low one is to live and what one is to do for a
living arc considered choices open for public, though not political, scrutiny. Failure to answer the questions or an inability to defend the choices properly is considered a sign of immaturity or confusion not befitting a full person or competent
individual. This process also persists today in college admissions, especially to elite
schools and programs. While we arc properly denied the use of things like race,
gender, religious affiliation, national origin, and so on in making admissions decisions, we arc allowed to use "personal state ments,, and interviews to make our selections. The basic goal of the personal statement is to convince the readers that
the student has given a good deal of thought as to the kind of life he or she thinks
valuable and that he or she is sufficiently able and committed to achieving it.
These arc just two instances of what I would call" ocratic instances,, in American
life.
A "Socratic instance,, is one where the participants in some brand of "conversation,, take for granted the proposition that " the unexamined life is not worth
living" (or at least not worthy of respect). uch an instance, (i.e., when a person
feels compelled to give a persuasive answer to the question, ccwhat do you want to
be when you grow up?,,), when shared between at least two parties,6 produces a
public spectacle that elicits judgment on the part of the observers and participants
regarding the choices and reasons offered up. The hope of such a process, when
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done in good fajth, is that the partners to the conversation will be improved
(i.e., rendered less "deformed"). Looking at the Apology, we sec Socrates proclaiming, in what would become a Millian spirit, that his practice of philosophy
renders him a friend to the city (29d; Arendt " Philosophy and Politics"). 11 is
preparedness to question any and all citizens whether rich or poor, cstablishcc.I
or marginal, and so on, in order to sec if the citizen "attaches little importance
to the most important things and greater importance to inferior things" (30a), is
a benevolent attempt to help individuals choose their lives and actions in ways
that will increase their happiness. As Socrates cxplajns a little later, he secs his
role as conferring on a subjects the "greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him
not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as
good and as wise as possible" (36d). Comparing himself to the well-treated and
publicly-rewarded "Olympian victor," Socrates asserts that "the Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy" (38c).
This distinction between thinking one's self happy and actually being happy
is not one that fine.ls a hospitable home in the ccmtcmpe>rary American liberal
mind. Americans tend to be either content or c.lisce>ntcnt, but sclc.lom can we
commit to the seeming absurdity of being discontent with what makes us content or content with what makes us discontent. Yet, this is exactly the sort of
stance that a richer Socratically-inspircd liberalism demands of us; this is the
sort of life called forth by a wisdom that "knows that it docs not know." Metaphorically, it is like a hummingbird at a feeder. From a distance the bird appears
still, but in reality, the wings arc moving at a tremendous rate to maintain the
stillness. If the Socratic/liberal mind is working optimally, the standing still
(contentment) is only achieved legitimately (being happy) by rapid, sustained
wing movement (discontentment comparable to self examination through
shared questions). In other words, the bird must move to stand still to achieve
its goal of eating from the feeder (happiness). To relinquish either part is to
" think oneself wise when one is not" or to "think yourself happy." This is ah10
how we can make sense of Aristotle's assertion that you cannot juc.lgc a man
happy until the end of his life. Unfortunately, contemporary Americans arc not
readily given to deferring gratification. This is what I will suggest leads to the
"misery of happiness."
Contemporary bourgeois citizens arc plagued by the " misery of happiness"
because they think themselves happy rather than being happy. This is because they
and their political culture have displaced what I will call authentic individualism
with "deviant" forms like expressive or possessive individualism (Macpherson).
The crude distinction between the two involves the former asserting that the
unexamined life is not worth living and the deviant form s, by whatever name,
making no such value claim.7 Thus, in deviant forms of liberalism, the
unexamined life is given moral and political equivalence to the examined life.
What I have called traditional liberalism would have nothing to do with such an
assertion, and the demands of "friendship" require that liberal thinkers do not let
the unexamined self go unchallenged. Before I continue, however, J want to be
clear that it is not my objective here to assert the existence of some core self or
"real" person who is engaging in some brand of fal se-consciousness and who is in

need of "wising up." On the contrary, I am not making any ontological claims;
instead, T am suggesting that within the liberal tradition right!J 11nderstood there is
a particular kine.I of individualism and happiness that historically corresponded
to the aims of political liberation, that the political constructions that followed
the initial formation of the tradition arc consistent with those aims, and that
these aims have been neglected or forgotten at the price of accomplishing the
original ends. I Jenee, if the original ends are still valued, then it behooves us to
recover the traditional meanings of individualism and happiness, such that they
might be lived agrun by those to whom the original aims appeal. Far then from
what might be thought of as metaphysics, my project is ultimately concerned
with how we live instead of what we are.
l'or purposes of this argument, I rely heavily on the ideal of "authenticity"
as articu lated by Charles Taylor. Referring to the work of Rousseau and later
I Ierdcr, Taylor suggests that the contemporary ideal of authenticity, that in its
most "degraded, absurd, or trivialized" form provides justification for "doing
you r own thing," rests o n a "powerful moral ideal that has come down to us"
(29). That ic.Jeal held that "there is a ccrtrun way of being human that is my way.
I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone
else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I
miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me" (28-29). E mbedded in such a view, of course, is the potential for the sort of social atomism and
solipsism that serves as the basis for numerous critiques of liberalism. 8 Yet, the
force of the ideal remains constant and, however battered, continues to serve as
the foundation for the constitutional protections that Americans take for
granted.
Where Taylor's argument joins the one I have been sketching, and moves us
beyond the more simplistic or heavy handed debates between liberalism and its
critics, is through his assertion of the " fundamentally dialogical character" of human life (33). Taylor calls this "dialogical charactee' of human life an " inescapable
horizon" (part of human facticity):
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We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and
hence of defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich human
languages of expression .... No one acquires the languages needed for selfdefinition on their own. We arc introduced to them through exchanges with
others who mauer to us.. .. The genesis of the human mind is in this sense
nol "monological," not something each accomplishes on his or her own, but
dialogical. (33)

rIcnce, who

I am and who you arc arc not separate questions if we arc familiar
with each other's lives, words, and expressive acts. We arc part of each other to the
extent that we carry on some sort of "conversation" that can challenge, change, or
reinforce our particular perceptions, beliefs, and choices. As "friends" (broadly
construed) we arc each other's Socratic interlocutor or Millian benevolent intervener; we arc each other's necessary source of " discontent" that makes liberal
happiness (contentment) possible. Moreover, this relationship is not bounded by
time or space insofar as our "conversations," while possibly constant in some
form, need not be immcc.liatc or concurrent with one another. Taylor explains:
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Moreover, this is not just a fact about genesis, which can be ignored later
on. It's not just that we learn the languages in dialogue and then go on
to use them for our own purposes on our own. This describes our
situation to some extent in our culture. We arc expected to develop
our own opinions, outlook, stances to things, to a considerable degree
through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work with
important issues, such as the definition of our identity. We define this
always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities
our significant others want to recognize in us. And even when we
outgrow some of the latter-our parents for instancc--and they
disappear from our Lives, the conversation with them continues within us as
long as we live. (33)

I would only add to Taylor's account by claiming that, aside from particular
others, we arc aJso in "conversation" with books, various forms of art, historical
ideas, and exemplary figures that we believe arc significant and that produce in us
a visceral need to respond. Those "texts" with which we construct and reconstruct our identities arc the root of a uthentic 0ibcral) individualism. lt is n process
that involves constant and conscious tinkering, like the movement of the
hummingbird's wings. Inauthentic "individualism" comes from at least two general directions: the "right," where conservative or more authority-minded thinken;
attempt to project a monologicaJ identity upon a person without giving the person
a chance to respond or otherwise participate in the conversation; and the "lcft,0
where the need for other voices is dismissed as irrelevant and often labeled authoritarian and illiberal. Oddly enough, however, both modes arc repressive from
the stance of authentic individualism. In turn, even when we accept the arguments of the right or the left willingly, we arc like Socrates' citizens who ench have
their own "Olympian victor'' who makes them "think themselves happy." Taylor
explains, "To shut o ut the demands emanating beyond the self is precisely to suppress the conditions of significance, and hence to court trivialfaation" (40). The
larger of the two problems in A merican political culture today, however, is the
former not the latter. Indeed, the " left" (those who dismiss other voices as irrelevant) has won this battle (unfortunately it may have come ironically at the price
of the war), insofar as even my most "conservative" students still believe that being called "judgmental" is a bad thing and that we shou ld do "whatever makes us
ha.ppy and n~t worry ab~ut w~at other people think." (Unless, of course, they
think you arc JUdgmcntaJ, m which case you sho uld worry what they think.) Under
the guise of tolerance, this flat and tepid individualism is, more often than not
just a thinly-masked excuse for a robust indifference and casuaJ conformity. l ~
other words, it is a relationship of convenience that, desp ite its pretense of nobility and homage, is rcalJy just a front for sclf-ccntcrcdncss and an excuse for intellectual and moraJ sloth. WhiJe there arc clements in such an assertion that dovetail
with similar neo-conscrvative critiques like those associated with Allan Bloom it
is more a reflection of how far we have moved from the initial liberal ideal tha~ a
reactionary or pre-modern lament. As Donald Lutz would remind us, good theory
has a transccndcn t character that political ideology typica lly docs not (1 O). Jn
othc.r wor~s, go~d. theory mig ht work for thinkers of very different political persuasions, like political dcccntraliiation in the hands of John Calhoun, Students for
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a Democratic ocicty, and the Black Panthers. This, of course, is not to say that
there arc not genuine and thoughtful liberals who believe that their approach and
work represent important and much needed additions, reforms, or clarifications to
a healthy and living liberalism. This essay, however, is directed at the political
thinkers and theorists who arc somehow complicit either directly or indirectly in
the drastic dilution of the liberal tradition by what they are 1101 doing. To them , I
would like to extend a challenge to reclaim lost ground for the sake of liberalism
itself.
Among the more prominent thinkers I am talking about is someone like Richard Rorty, who has spoken about both liberaJ theory and liberal practice. He
and many others have been successful in persuading their fellow citizens of at
least the public utility of treating their commitments as "contingent," insofar as
arguments from authority or first principles arc not considered socially persuasive or definitive. While for many this plays out in an increase in toleration for
difference and a renewed respect for diversity, it has also had the unintended
consequence of allowing those uninterested in such things to hold their authoritnrian beliefs with more security and with less need of sustained or rigorous defense. If the left is freed from accountability to public reason, so too is the
right. 9 Jn turn, the progressive political agenda that Rorty in particular has
lin ked himself to in his recent book Achieving 011r Co1111try, an agenda that requires a high level of commitment and sacrifice, is, in all likelihood, going to
fa ll on deaf cars because he gives no better reason for thinking like he does politically than that he thinks that way. Sadly, for all his philosophical power,
Rorty's most enduring contribution to the public reaJm will probably be an increase in indifference and perhaps even seriously decreased levels of tolerance.
O n the other hand, there arc other contemporary thinkers who understand
this problem quite well. Will Kymlicka begins with what I would term a self-evident, though often ove rlooked, truth as it relates to the liberaJ world:
Our essential interest is in leading a good life, in having those things that a
good life conlains. That may seem to be a pretty banal claim. But it has
important consequences. For leading a good life is different from leading the
life we mrrenl/y belietie to be good-that is, we recognize that we may be
mistaken about the worth or value of what we arc currently doing. We may
come to sec that we have been wasting our lives, pursuing trivial or shallow
goals and projecls that we had mistakenly considered of great importance.

(10)

William Galston echoes this idea by asking us to consider two ideal types, ''Liberal" and "Traditional." Tn his words:
Liberal lives her life in full awareness of the truth value of pluralism. She
knows that her way of li fe, although a source of meaning and satisfaction, is
but one among many defensible lives she might have led under different
circumstances.... By contrast, to the extent that he is even aware of ways of
life other than his own, Traditional regards them as in ferior or even
contemp tible. I le docs not sec his own way of li fe as a choice, and because
he believes there is only one right way to live, he sees no particular value in
the fact of individuals' identification with ways of li fe other than his own. If
value plumlism has objective validity, the Libeml knows something that
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Traditional does not (773)

Among the things that Liberal must consider that Traditional either need not or
~ann·o·t is.that her way of life might be wrong. If she "forgets" this by preventing
mqu1ncs mto her reasons for the choice she has made, the distinction between the
two types disappears and even Libcral's liberalism becomes "traditional."
Liberal states and liberal citizens arc precluded from forcing us into living a
different kind of life even if they think we arc mistaken. Indeed, they arc precluded from using force of any kind, even if we ourselves claim we arc mistaken.
~h~n.ge, if it is to come, must be the product of a free choice on the part of the
mdiv1dual or else the change is illiberal. I Iowcver, this docs not mean that external entities are not allowed to influence the choices of an inc.livic.lual as an
extension of their own liberty. In fact, friends, and perhaps others as well, may
even have a duty to provide such input out of either self-interest or benevolent
conc~rn. In America, however, liberal practice and some liberal thought has progressively fallen deeper into an illogical trap best symbolized by what we as a
culture have decided is 1101 to be discussed in polite company (or at the dinner
table for that mattcr)-namcly, politics and religion (Neuhaus). For 1mmc, this
silence is the product of a strategy of conflict avoidance, but for others, it is
the product of a mistaken understanding of what l have called liberalism's teleological imperative. As argued above, for our individualism to be robust,
meaningful, and authentic, it must be dialogical; this idea is supportec.l still further by the fact that our current beliefs about the good life can be mistaken
(and, hence, in need of reform). As such, not only arc we o/101116d to talk about
these things in a critical manner with others, sci f-intcrest and/ or friendship demands that we do. Some liberal theorists and thoughtful liberal citizens have
mistakenly assumed that the requirement of some form of neutrality (here to be
read as simply non-suppression) on the part of a liberal state requires the same
neutrality on their part. However, what liberalism precludes the state from c.loing is not meant to be precluded altogether, but rather such power is appropriately ~~nsfcrred to the citb~cnry itself, including, of course, political theorists
a~~ cnacs. 1 ~ ~ f both the state and the citizenry arc precluded from engaging ind1v1duals cnacally, then we must ask, "Who is left?" The answer is, obviously,
no one. The result of this is to create a monological vacuum in which (to steal a
phrase from Tocqueville) each of us is s hut up in the soUtude of his or her own
heart and, hence, rendered incapable of the authentic individualism that liberalism was meant to fa.cilitate in th~ first place. In turn, when viewed through the
l~ns ~f hu.~an .hap~~ncss, t~crc is no longer a good answer to the question 1111!]
lzberalrsm? I he inability to give a good answer to that question is effectively to
have lost the soul of liberalism.
Americans used to know this. From the Church pulpit to the political platform, and in many places in between, Americans confronted each other as citizcnfricnds and. ar~~u~atcd .in conversation an answer to the root question, "r row
ought I to _live? Even if we grant the premise of Rorty and his fellow-travelers
that there is no foundational or " final vocabulary" that can be referenced in answer to the "why" question, it docs not mean we must accept his assertion that
"the vocabu lary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argu-
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mcnt" (Co11ti11ge11cy xiv). Indeed, the very lack of such a vocabulary points toward the Emcrsonian dictum that "frequent self-examination is the duty of all"
(qtd. in Abbott 14). The lack of our ability to definitively settle the question
docs not logically imply that the question itself and our repeated, varied attempts to answer it a rc without value; as Camus cautions us at the close of his
short story, "We must imagine Sisyphus happy."
When all is said and done, Rorty's faux-Cartesianism that points toward something like I am therefore I ofll, makes the distinction between the examined life and
the unexamined life all but irrelevant roll the rock up the hill, don't roll the rock
up the hill, it's all the same. Yet, however true this might be from the outsidein-perspcctive of the philosopher, it is not the same from the inside-out-perspective of the searching individual. The argument thus far has been that
happiness depends on the dialogic search itself. Liberalism, rightly understood,
requires that same perpetual question and struggling on the part of its adherents. To help in the partial recovery of the "soul" of liberalism, I suggest that
we look to what one theorist has termed the "sermonic tradition" in American
political thought as an example of the deeper sort of liberal tradition being described in this essay, liberalism with a purpose. Jn his States of Perftct Freedom,
Philip Abbott argues that the "scrmonic tradition" that links the work of
American political actors and thinkers as diverse as Benjamin l'ranklin and
Malcolm X represents a "common form of political thinking in America" that
should be viewed not as "defective or truncated political thought'' but as "one
that originates from America's unique historical position" (10-11). Abbott argues that the essential fcnturcs of the scrmonic tradition can be summed up in
the following manner:
First, it repeatedly asks the same type question: " I low cn.n I be saved/
successful/ virtuous/ rich/healthy /happy?" Emerson once remarked that
each person was confronted with a very practical question: "l low ought I to
live?" That a question such as this should be regarded as practical reveals a
central aspect of American political thought. The sermonic tradition suffers
less from an inability to grasp political categories than from a belief that this
"practical" question is a logically (and morally) prior one. Thus the question
" I low ought I to live?" involves n conscious attempt to politicize personal life
and indirectly (and often unwittingly) challenges the libero! distinction
between state and society and public and private.... But most of all, the
scrmonic tradition ... assumes that each individual is responsible for the
rightness and wrongness of an issue, that he or she must make a decision on
the issue in question, that upon making that decision must act on it at once,
that while such aclion has national, even worldwide import, above all it has
personal significance. Those who do not accept such a change of heart arc
regarded with suspicion and often open hostility. (11 -12)

Where Plato suggested in the Rep11blic that we look to the larger city in order to sec
the individual soul, Abbott secs the American strategy as the inverse: we look to
the smaller individual in order to understand the city. With its emphasis on consent and the social contract, such a view seems perfectly appropriate in the context
of liberal political theory. When we look to those individuals, however, we should
not sec static, unchanging selves, but rather individuals searching and offering
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themselves up as examples, as living, breathing counter-intuitivcs for other individuals. Viewing autobiography as "sermonic assertion," Abbott argues that it and
the larger tradition it represents in American culture "not only tells us about the
process of individual political commitment but it also reveals a great deal about
the formation of the self in liberal society,, (13).
Extrapolating from this particular representation of the tradition, it is my
contention that "sermonic assertion" aimed at producing periodic changes of
heart is at the root of a properly understood "dialogical" liberalism. JJenee, the
onus would seem to be on those who want to argue from within the tradition that
the unexamined life is worth living, and that it is just as valuable and theoretically
coherent as the examined life. Yet, there has been little in the way of a sustained defense of this position, and it is my argument that from within the liberal tradition no such defense can effectively be made. I would assert that while
coercion regarding the good life is not allowed, mutual "proselytizing" is not
only desirable, but necessary and perhaps even required. Oddly enough though,
much current public thinking and practice rejects public proselytizing as impolite at best and anti-liberal at worst. The "sermonic tradition" and the dialogic,
contentious, and liberal tradition it represents, has all but been vanquished from
the contemporary American public square in favor of a significantly thinner,
m ore insular and bourgeoisified individualism. (1 t seems that today we must
now be kept safe from the opinions and questions of others as well as their actions.) Below, I will sketch some partial evidence of this phenomenon and discuss what I sec as the current and long range political and cultu ral problems of
this transformation as a rationale for recovering and embracing the demands of
an earlier "thicker" American liberatism.

The Challenge of Fight Club
There is any number of fiJms, books, or other cultural representations that
co~ld serve ~s a conduit for my purposes here. The film A1mrica11 Bea11ty comes
quickly to mind. Indeed, there is a whole genre of film s that I would call A111erica11
angst movies, movies that caJI the thinness of bourgeois life into question to various ends. Yet, a good many of them ultimately rcify some version of that which
they seek to criticize by choosing something like bourgeois love over bourgeois
career, and so on. In American Bea11ty, for example, Kevin Spacey's trek back in to
th~ counter-~ulture lifestyle that his suburban existence had all but vanquishc<l is
ult:unately rej ected. In place of his idealized bohemianism, we arc asked by the
now dead protagonist to sec beauty everywhere, even in the " dance" of a discarded plastic bag.
This is where Fight C/11b departs from its species and itself attempts to
"evolve." Fight C/11b winces at the end, but it docs not flin ch. On th e other hand
the .wince i~sel f is aJJ. too telling and representative of America's problems.'' Th~
basic s t~ry .~s ra~her simple. The narrator "Jack" (played by Edward Norton) is, as
he puts it, a thtrty year old boy" who has become a "slave to the IKEA nesting
instinct" an~ asks questions li~e "what sort of dining set defines me as a person?"
As he explains after an explosion wipes out his apartment, " When you buy furniture you tell yourself, 'O. k. that's the last sofa I'm gonna need. Whatever else happens I've got that sofa thing covered.' I had it all. I had a stereo that was very
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decent, a wardrobe that was getting very respectable. I was close to being complete." Jack, a recall administrator, paints a rather disturbing picture of a corporate
America, where the decision by a car company to recall a particular line of cars is
the product of a simple mathematical equation that works like this: take the number of cars of that make on the road (A), the rate of failure (B), the average cost
of an out-of-court settlement (C), multiply them together and compare to the
cost of a recall (X). Tf Ax Bx C< X, then there is no recall no matter how many
deaths and injuries may result. Instead of using this information in any
Silkwoodesque manner, however, Jack uses it to leverage his employer into paying
him not to work or come to the office.
Plagued not by his conscience but by the extreme banality of his bourgeois
existence, Jack creates a swaggering alter ego named Tyler Durden (played by Brad
Pitt). Together, he and Tyler create a phenomenon called "Fight Club," where men
get together in dank basements and beat each other bloody. The fights are as brutal as Jack's daytime incarnation is banal, but no one dies and at the close of the
fights there is a cathartic embrace and praise heaped on the founders for creating
this opportunity to feel alive. In Jack's words, "Fight Club wasn't about winning or
losing; it wasn't about words. The hysterical shouting was in tongues-like a Pentecostal church. When the fighting was over nothing was solved, but we all felt
saved." Fight Club is both the antithesis and ultimate expression of the contemporary support groups that the movie openly mocks. As the phenomenon spreads
and new fight clubs begin springing up al l over the country, the movie turns haphazardly towards the political. The fight dubbers arc slowly molded into a prankster army of corporate saboteurs who don the black fatigues and boots and
haircuts of a neo-fascist movement and worship Tyler Durden while renouncing
their own identities to better serve the cause. T hat cause is the destruction of corporate (bourgeois) America in the form of blowing up credit card companies to
create the "collapse of financial history" that will move us "one step closer to economic eq uilibrium.'' While the violence early in the film and crude politics of the
movie's end led many critics to denounce the film as an apology for fascism, no
one other than the most piously anti-ironic viewer could really take the visible
"politics" of the movie's end seriously. One need only ponder for a moment the
fact that the o nly member of the fight club "army" that was known by name was
Robert Paulson (played by Meat LoaQ. Paulson was a 300+ pound man with extremely large breasts and no testicles. While his character is certainly the representative of the movie's social emasculation sub-text, he is no one's poster-boy for the
master-race. Even the would-be " Hitler" in the bunker, Jack, is a screw-up; his attempt to kill himself by placing a gun in his mouth and pulling the trigger results
in blowing out the side of his face. l le is left disfigured and bloody but not badly
injured and, as the financial district explodes around them, he reassures the love
interest, Marla, that " Everything is going to be fine.... You met me at a very
strange time in my life." (l'his is the " wince.")
f'or all its raw power and emo tion, Fight Club ends in a wink when the viewer
had expected at least some sort of vision. While it doesn't let us off the hook
completely, it docs lack the nerve, will, self-confidence, or perhaps, in the mind of
the writer, the right to point out a direction of its own. While telling us that we are
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While the bluntness of this speech anc..I others like it tends towards the dic..lactic, it
is ultimately an impotent didacticism. In academic language, Anne Norton>s allusion to a similar problem captures the so rrow but not the rage of the Durc..lcn
character, "The individuality we pri%c is rcali%ed in purchases that dcconstruct it"
(4). One step forward, one step back; the game is rigged. We arc consumers for
whom consumption has become an encl rather than a means because the act itself
"dcconstructs" the goal of the initial act. This elusiveness is a formula for unhappmess.
As I said at the o utset, there arc bigger problems in the world. Much of the
world would be hard pressed to feel sympathy for this plight. But, like it or not,
these "middle children of history," our "motorcycle boys and girls," represent an
important problem for liberalism and American society and a challenge to American political thinkers and theorists. I t is a problem going unadclrcssecl and a chat-

lenge going mostly unmet. fi'irst and foremost, in terms of reasons for that neglect, is the fact that the situation has developed incrementally and, for the
most part, unconsciously over the last 30 years. Only recently has what used to
be called "decadence" become a more general possibility in our culture. Like the
self-made man of American lore who out of good fortune managed to produce
only indolent children, our culture is ill-prepared to deal with a problem that no
one imagined would be a problem and that we are embarrassed to talk about seriously lest we be thought boorish or insensitive. While many of us may loath
the unironic Tyler Durdcns in our midst when they claim, ''We're by-products of
a lifestyle obsession .... What concerns [us] are celebrity magazines, televisions
with 500 channels, some guy>s name on [our] underwear, Rogain, Viagra,
Olestra," we ignore them at great peril. Like it or not, what Fitzgerald said
about the rich, we can now say about many Americans-they're different. Once
we realize this, we arc faced with three general choices regarding them: we can
ignore them , indulge them, or confront them. The first strategy is the one I associate with a failing contemporary American liberalism. The second strategy describes a post-liberal or bourgeois approach. The third is the strategy I associate
with Mill anc..I trnc..litional liberalism. As Norton,s argument above makes clear,
there arc numerous interests that benefit from the perpetual grasping and losing
and grasping again. Ultimately, the silence on the question of the good life by
thinkers and theorists c..loes not go unanswered, but rather is answered by those
who arc either non-liberal or alibcral. As such, in America the "good life" most
often gets mcrgec..I into what was once called the "high Life."
Fight C/11b shows that this merger, this "bourgeoisification" of American culture, has failed to create the happiness of liberalism, but the film has apparently
not found a reasonable substitute. Simply being anti-bourgeois leaves us in a void
where we do not know what we arc for. It would have almost been a relief if the
writers could have taken their "fascism" seriously as an alternative rather than
mocking it-at least then there would have been something to talk about. As it is,
however, there is no conversation or dialogue about anything; indeed, viewers are
told, "The first rule of fight club is don't talk about fight club.... The second rule
of project mayhem is c..lon't ask questions." So it is on the verge of his great nihilistic success that our protagonist kills the voice of Durden while simultaneously
trying to kill himself. I fis road has led to nowhere and we are too polite, indifferent, or self-interested to suggest where else he might go. This is not friendship.
Under a mistaken and expansive view of liberal neutrality, we leave our
"Jacks" and "J ills," our "middle children of history" cum "Motorcycle boys and
girls" in a monological cage from which we once had the ability, the right, and perhaps even the duty to release them. r urthcrmorc, we impoverish ourselves because they, in turn, refrain from intervening in our lives and constructions of self.
Liberalism, the selves it was designed to help nurture, and the happiness that was
its end arc thus frustrated and eventually thwarted. Some form of "sermonic assertion" or Socratic confrontation might have rescued us from the very thing we
now leave in the hands of advertisers and other monologically inclined thinkers
who have no interest in seeing us or anyone else saved. We (and the film itself)
have answercc.J the q uestion " how ought I to live?" with a shrug that symbolizes at
worst "what do J care" and at best "it's not for me to say."
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"not unique snowflakes," we "are not the car [wcl drive, the contents of [our]
wallets, [and] not our khakis" and that "it's only after we've lost everything that
we arc free to do anything" it never stoops to give us a real hint about what we
arc or what we should be. It is a screeching jeremiad without the "good news."
It is bereft of "scrmonk assertion." Many will, of course, say quickly that that
is precisely the point-to strip away the seductive and protective sheathing of
the contemporary world and expose its raw acidic reality to a complacent and
desensitized audience-public. Many may even be quick to say that the movie is
playing the Socratic role I praised earlier. But, this is wrong. ocrates' questioning was designed to show individuals where they had perhaps reasoned incorrectly. Where Socrates ostensibly took neither a position nor a side, Fight C/11b
has taken a side but not a position. We know what Jack (and Fight C/11b) is
against, but we do not know what he is for. As such, he is both a product of
contemporary libcralism,s failure and a co-conspirator in its continued demise.
Almost as if conscious of this he exclaims in a third-person reference to himself, "This is Jack,s wasted life."
After pummeling the audience and, literally, himself; after calling on us to
"consider the possibility that God docs not like you, that he never wanted you,
that in all probability he hates you;" and after rallying us to "fuck ambition" and
"fuck redemption" and accept our fate as "Goc.l,s unwanted children," he leaves us
on our own and without example. Because, even though "you weren't alive anywhere like you were at fight club," there is no sense that Jack was happy in the
fight club. And while certainly living counter-culturally in the extreme, he was still
not living deliberately in Thorcau>s sense of the term.
The film's passionate diagnosis of the problem of bourgcoisification resonates, I believe, with many younger and early middle-agec..1 Americans (especiall y
men). Tyler exclaims to his fellow-travelers:
An entire generation wasted. Slaves with while collars. Advertising has us
cherishing cars and cloths, working jobs we hale so that we c:rn buy shit we
don't need. We arc the middle children of history. No purpose or place. We
have no great war, no Great Depression. Our great war is a spiritual war; our
great Depression is our lives. We've all been raised on television to believe
that one day we would all be millionaires, movie-gods, and rock-stars. But, we
won't. We are slowly learning that fact and we arc pissed off.
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Conclusion
In a 1940 essay in The New Rtp11blic titled "The Corruption of Liberalism,"
Lewis Mumford drew a sharp distinction between what he called "ideal liberalism" and " pragmatic liberalism." A lthough he was writing about America's positio n regarding WWII and A merican neutrality, I believe that his basic distinctions
and arguments can be applied to o ur contemporary "spiritual war." Mumford argued that " liberals no lo nger act as if justice mattered, as if truth mattered, as if
right mattered, as if humanity as a whole was any concern of theirs: the truth is
they no lo nger dare to act" (568). Pointing to fou ndational thinkers like Voltaire
and Ro usseau, Mum ford traces the initial corruption of " ideal liberalism" to excessive concern with "the machinery of life" to the neglect of "csthctics, ethics,
and religion" (569). T his excessive concern resulted in people who arc "unconscio us ... of the sources of their ethical ideas" and who "pick up more or lc1:1s
what happens to be lying aro und them, without any effort at consistency or clarity
... here a scrap left over fro m childhood, the re a fragment of Kant or Bentham,
o r again a dash of Machiavelli, pacifist Quakers one moment and quaking
N ietzscheans the next" (569). To the " pragmatic liberal," the idea that there might
be " internal obstacles to external imp rovement seemed absurd." 1n turn, those
same thinkers rejected the idea that "there was a field for imaginative design and
rational discipline in the bu ilding of a pe rsonality as in the building of a skyscraper" (570). To wit, according to Mum fo rd, "immature personalities, irrational
personalities, demo ralized personal ities arc as inevitable as wccc.ls in an uncul tivated garden when no deliberate attempt is made to provic.le a constructive basis
for personal develo pmenr' (570).
W hile for some this lack of effort is simply the proc.luct of indiffe rence or
fear of confro ntatio n, fo r others, incluc.ling conte mpo rary liberals, it is a principled
position. Extrapolating fro m the assertion of neutrali ty o n the part of liberal
states (Kukathas), liberal citizens fallacio usly assume that they too arc rct1uircc.l to
remain neutral and silent in the face of other citizens' choices and commitments
or lack thereof. The no tio n of "sermo nic assertion" is viewcc.l suspicio usly as just
ano ther form of quasi-authoritarian in tervention into another's right to pursue
happiness. This is, o f course, an exact inversio n of what l have argued is the rationale for liberalism in the first place, no t to mentio n an attempted transfiguratio n
o f its dialogical nature. As Mum ford himself pu ts it: " Liberalism, by and la rge,
has prided itself upon its colorless ness and its emotio nal neutrality; a nd this liberal
suspicion o f passion is partly respo nsible the liberal's inep titude for actio n" (571).
To move beyo nd that "ineptitude" and meet the chall enge of Fight C/11b, the rightful limits on the liberal state must be de-conflated fro m the inappro priately sclfimposed limitatio ns o n liberal citizens. failure to do so leaves a vacuum that, if in
th e unlikely event it is left unfilled, robs o ur frie nds in the liberal state of the
chance to achieve true happiness. More likely, however, that vacuum will be filled
by those who arc no t " friends" of individual happiness, but arc instead commercial partisans interested in their own pecuniary gain.
Not only is "dialogical interventi o n," "scrmo nic assertio n," o r Socratic interrogation perfectly consiste nt with th e neutral liberal state, they a rc exactly th e in-
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tended outcome of limiting the state in such a way in the first place. Liberals
could learn much by re-reading Aristotle's Ethics and then thinking about the
difference between the phrases "self-intercsr' and "interest of a self" (Smith;
Duncan). The commonplace political understanding of the first term suggests
that each person readily knows "what's best for him or her," while the second
should be seen as suggesting that selves may have certain interests that they can
only come to know through learning vis-a-vis conversations with others and
with various social "texts." A corrupted liberalism is o ne that has discarded the
latter and carelessly reified the former; a healthy and historically grounded liberalism is one that will reverse this transfiguration. Will Kymlicka is right when
he claims that in a liberal society "individuals must have the cultural conditions
conducive to acquiring an awareness of different views about the good life, and
to acquiring an ability to intelligently examine and re-examine these views"
(13). Without this, liberal happiness is not only elusive but, for many individuals, unattainable. The lives of such people wiJJ be metaphorically like Jack's
when he looks to his apartment and laments: "A house fuJI of condiments and
no fooc.l." Without dialogic or sermonic prodding toward a richer more fulfilling
diet, America will continue to cat only the thinnish gruel of bourgeois life. If
America's liberal citizenry or her theorists and intellectuals do not attem pt to
supply more substantial "liberal" nourishment to those living non-deliberatively
anc.l, hence, in a state of perpetual spiritual hunger (Myers), they will undoubtec.lly search elsewhere for "food." 1f the money holds up, chances are most will
look to even more consumption for their spiritual "calories." However, increasingly that will not suffice, at which point anything is possible.
In a 1940 review of A1ei11 Kampf, George Orwell assets that Hitler "grasped
the falsity of the hedonistic attitude to life" (14). Though the context was differe nt, I believe that his sentiments are still sound; he explains, "Socialism, and
even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people 'I offer you a good
time,' r fitler has saic.l to them 'I offer you struggle, danger and death,' and as a
resul t a whole nation flings itself at his feet" (14). An older liberalism could
meet such a challenge and win; I am not convinced that its contemporary iteratio n in the work of some theorists and "practitioners" is as sound.

Notes
1. ln a response to the philosophic stance of Richard Rorty,Jean E lshtain makes a
very important argument concerning the centrality of cer tain foundational ideals to the moral and even heroic actions of people in various historical situations
like the I folocaust. I fer persuasive claim is that for the actors themselves, their
actio ns make little sense if detached from the essentialist grounding or "first
vocabularies" they assumed as the basis for taking action. E lshtain offers a challenge a nd a critique of those who would attempt to wholly deny or suppress
those "first vocabularies": " ] t might be an interesting exercise for Rorty to rewri te the declaration of hu man rights so that it retains its power to condemn
separate, and de fine yet abandons the basis on which it now docs so. Celebrating
the c.lcclinc of religious faith, which served initially to underscore natural Jaw
and natural right, Rorty wants to maintain and sustain the injunctio ns imbcdded
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in such earlier formulations" (&o/ 333).
2. While the literature surrounding this period is vast, the following arc among
the most important and comprehensive works. Issac Kramnick's "Republican
Revisionism Revisited" (1982); Robert E. Shalhope's "Republicanism and
Early American I Iistoriography" (1982); Bernard Bailyn's The Ideological Origins
of the A111erico11 Revo/11tio11; Gordon Wood's The Creation of the A111erico11 &p11biic, 1776-1787 (1972); J. G. A. Pocock's The Mochiovellia11 NlomMI (1975);
Thomas L. Pangle's The Spirit of Modem Rep11blico11ism (1988); Sheldon Wolin's
The Presmce of the Post: Buoys 011 the State and Co11stil11tio11 (1990); Joshua
Miller's The Rise 011d Foll of Democrory i11 A111erico, 1630-1789 (1991).
3. See Isaiah Berlin's Fo11r Buoys 011 Uberty (1969); William A. Galston's Uberal
P11rposes (1991) and "Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory" (1999);
and Mkhacl Wal ~er's Spheres of j11Jlice: A Defa11se of Pl11ralism a11d Bq11ality
(1983).
4. Aristotle argues in Book VI I J of the Ethics that "perfect friendship" is based
upon desiring "the good of their friends for the friend's sake ... because each
loves the other for what he is and not for any incidental quality" (263).
5. Joseph Cropsey associated this process with the tcachingt; of Thomas I fobbes,
who he argues taught a softer version of modernity's lesson than thinkers like
Machiavelli by extolling the " virtues" of "survival, security, and freedom to cultivate private and privately-felt predilections" (7) to the neglect of any greater or
higher ambitions. Sec also Catherine Zuckert's "The Role of the Spiritedness in
Politics" (1988).
6. In an extended essay on the relationship between philosophy and politics,
H annah Arendt argues that "the plurality of men can never entirely be abolished" because, "even if I were to live entirely by myself I would, aR long as I
am alive, live in the condition of plurality. l have to put up with myself, and nowhere docs this I-with-myself show more clearly than in pure thought, always a
dialogue between the two who I am" ("Philosophy and Politics" 86).

Bellah, ct. al., Habits of the Hearl: Individ11olislll a11d Commitment in American
Ufa (1985) and Alasdair Maclntyre's After Virt11e (1984).
9. Sec Stanley Fish's Doing lf/hot Comes Nat11ral!J (1989), "Mission Impossible:
Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State" (1997) and There} No
S11ch Thi11g as Free Speech (1994). Por an interesting response to much of this
line of thought in Fish's work see J. Judd Owen's "Church and State in
Stanley Fish's Antiliberalism."
th
10. Although the 10 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is often read in light
of questions of federalism, i.e., the power of the national government versus
the powers of the states, the last clause reserves powers not delegated to the
people. Read as a communitarian or "republican" document rather than a libertarian one, the Bill of Rights, including this clause, should be seen as authorizing exactly the sort of public confrontation on behalf of individual
citizens that liberal constitutionaHsm denied initially to the national government and subsequently to the states.
11.Whilc it might be correctly pointed out that the movie itself is engaged in
exactly the sort of cultural conversation I am arguing for when viewed from
the perspective of the book's author (Chuck Palahniuk) or the film's director
(David Fincher), the internal dynamic of the film or the "story" itself may be
criticized for failing in its instructive, constructive or dialectical mission in
such a way that it ends up at least partially reifying exactly what it was intended to deconstruct. Perhaps one piece of admittedly anecdotal and cursory
evidence that could sustain this line of thought were the instances of actual
"fight clubs" that formed in the immediate wake of the movie, thereby stripping the film in reality of the irony necessary to sustain its own
deconstructivc effort. Indeed, upon hearing of such "clubs," I was reminded
of the people's call to Nietzsche's Zarathustra "to make us into these last
men" (130). To which he responded, as perhaps Palahniuk himself might
have, "They understand me not: I am not mouth for these cars" (1 30).

7. On this point I take my cue from Charles Taylor, who in part takes his from
Tocqucvillc's distinction between "individualism" and "egoism." At the root of
the notion of the "examined life" is, I would argue, at least the possibility or recognition that one could be wrong about the mds he or she has selected and not
just about the !lleo11s for achieving those ends. But, in either its "expressive" or
its " possessive" form, liberalism cannot brook the sort of limits that arc implied
by the notion that one could have been wrong about what one wanted because
(tautological though it is) it was what one wanted then, even if one wants something else now. There is no need for conversation per sc but rather an announcement or enactment of one's desires followed by the actions needed to achieve
the desired ends. As Taylor puts it, " Freedom allows you to do what you want,
and the greater application of instru mental reason gets you more of what you
want, whatever it is" (21).
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American Spirit
Rachna bunches her shoulders, exhaling a
breath of sweetness from syrupy le.boa ga/11b jama11,
her after school snack. She slumps in the kitchen
chair while looking out the bay window, her complacent gaze serene like lotus flowers. She's forgotten about the wrinkled notebook paper sandwiched
between the pages of her spelling book Her body,
dimpled with baby fat, shifts methodically, slightly
rocking the feet of the chair. The house is still.
Only Rachna and I arc home. While I fry Ranjeet's
favorite meal for hot sticky days like today-spinach and potato fried pakoras rubbed in curry
toppled over sweet-smelling basmali rice-I see
llachna from the corner of my eye, intermittently
nursing the ball of her thumb in her lily-thin
mouth. The Arizona blistering September heat
rubs up against red-hot oil, splaying my skin with a
clinging, indiscernible smell.
"Rachna baby, what's wrong?
"Mummy, when is Papa coming home?"
" oon, beta. Only an hour or so more. Papa is
very busy."
"The Chevron is busy, Mummy? No, Papa
promised he'd take me for pizza! Todcry. Ile said so
yesterday at the store!" She throws her arms over
her head in protest, her chapped lips ballooning
into a pout. "I don't want Indian food! I want
. I"
plZZa
"Ch11pl Quiet! tart your homework. Enough
daydreaming. 'I'ime for news now. You sit with me
or do your homework. Your choice."
" it with youl" she bellows, her bright eyes
snowy with anticipation. I turn off the wok; I have
made plenty of pakoras for now. My body moves
slowly to the living room couch, my ankles swollen
and too heavy to hold me up. Rachna bounces like
all happy little girls do, pulling at the hem of my
sari. I Icr truthful, innocent eyes cannot grasp the
week's terrifying ache. he says her schoolteacher
talks about the twin towers collapsing and lets
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